continued. The US signed bilateral agreements with South Korea (1953), the Republic of China (Taiwan) (1954), Iran (1959), Pakistan (1959), and Turkey (1959). In 1954 South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was created. In 1959 the US became a member of Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).
Also the Middle East became the area of concern, especially after the Suez crizis (1956). Fear of Communist incursions in this area led to the formulation of Eisenhower Doctrine.
Of course, the most important event during this period was the Cuban crisis (1962). It was the most dangerous event of the Cold War, and a good lesson for the officials of both superpowers. A nuclear exchange was so close that both White House and Kremlin officials frankly expected the bombs to fall. They recognized that the superpowers must change their policies.
3. Competetive Coexistence, 1963-1968. Because of growing parity of American and Soviet military capabilities the fact was that the alternatives were coexistence or noncoexistence. The powers began to look for the ways to coexistence. One of the first signs was the instaliation of the “hot line” linking the White House and the Kremlin With a direct communication system in 1963. Also a number of agreements were negotiated: The Antarctic Treaty (1959), The Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), The Outer Space Treaty (1967), The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (1968). All this paved the way towards detente.
4. Detente, 1969-1978. Detente - a policy and a process designed to relax tensions between the superpowers. Nixon and Kissinger viewed detente as yet another in a long series of attempts to contain the power and the influence of the SU.
In July 1969, the Nixon Doctrine was declared. There were three major points: (1) that the US will keep all of its treaty commitments; (2) that the US will provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a allied nation; and (3) that the US will furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with treaty commitments.
The first real step in implementation of the Nixon Doctrine was the gradual withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam. Nixon also reduced the “two-and-one-half” war strategy to a “one-and-one-half” war strategy.
There were two requirements for implementing detente: (1) to engage the SU in serious negotiations; (2) the concept of linkage .
Detente led to a series of negotiations and signing of treaties. The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) was signed in 1972, the Vladivostok Accords - in 1974, the Helsinki Agreement - in 1975, and SALT II - in 1979 (SALT II was never ratified by the Congress).
At the same time the more serious doubts about mutual assured destruction strategy (MAD) arose. Early in 1974, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)-242. This was the shift of emphasis away from the MAD strike options in the strategic war plans toward more limited and flexible options designed to control escalation and neutralize any Soviet advantage.
Another important issue was China. During the late 1960s, both Nixon and Kissinger had reached the conclusion that it would not be wise to leave China permanently isolated. Also it became clear that the split between the SU and the China was real. Recognition of the People’s Republic of China and full diplomatic relations with the Beijing goverment took effect on January 1, 1979.
Carter came into office in January 1977. In general, the Carter administration continued the same strategy as Nixon. But some changes were introduced. The Carter administration emphasized a more global agenda, concentrating on regional issues, the North-South relationship, the economic interdependence of the industrial democracies, and human rights. Another important departure was a renewed emphasis on moralism in US policy.
The end of detente was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Ronald Sullivan pointed out: “The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan finally closed the door on the policy experiment known as detente.”
5. Confrontation, 1979-1986. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan opened the new period of the US-Soviet relations. Confrontation rather than accomodation had once again become the dominant mode of interaction between the superpowers.
Even before that the first signs of confrontation appeared. Carter Doctrine (1979) declared: “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the USA.” So, the invasion was regarded as an assault. Carter Doctrine also underlined the importance of Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), which was created in December 1979.
In 1981 Ronald Reagan assumed office. His administration began to pursue much more anti-Communist policy. The keys to the Reagan foreign policy were to be: military and economic revitalization, revival of alliances, stable progress in the Third World, and a firm Soviet policy based on Russian reciprocity and restraint.
In March 1983 President Reagan announced Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as “Star Wars”. The US shifted the focus from offense to defense. The new strategy suggested a profound shift in US nuclear strategy away from reliance on offensive missiles to deter an attack - that is, from dependence on MAD, which Reagan deemed “morally unacceptable.”
The new strategy led to a major increase in defense spending. Real spending in fiscal year 1985 was over 50 per cent greater than in fiscal year 1980. Reagan administration also focused its atention on regional problems. In 1983, a new joint service command - CENTCOM - was established to deal specifically with contingents in Southwest Asia. By early 1986, a new element of strategy informally known as the “Reagan Doctrine” had appeared. This policy sought to roll back Soviet and Cuban gains in the Third World by active support of liberation movements in areas such as Nicaragua, Angola, and Afghanistan.
During this period the relations between the superpowers were highly escalated. But situation changed when Gorbachev came to power in the SU in 1985.
Ending the Cold War, 1987-1990.
Gorbachev’s ‘Novoye Myshlenniye’ or New Thinking in international affairs was first spelt out at the Geneva summit with President Reagan in October 1985, when they agreed in principle to work towards a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to cut their nuclear arsenals in half.
Probably the most radical summit was the Reykjavik summit in October 1986. Despite that fact that no agreement was signed, “it succeeded beyond the limited horizons of diplomats and arms controllers in that it shocked the US-Soviet negotiations into a wholly new dimension. The old ground rules of superpower poker, of incremental gains and minimal concessions, had been ripped up.” In fact, both Reagan and Gorbachev recognized the posibility of nuclear free world. More, they both made it their major mutual goal.
The real agreement was reached at the Washington summit in December 1987. The US and the SU signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and formalized their commitment to a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms. “The signing of the INF Treaty signalled an end to the New Cold War.”
Following a meeting between Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Schevardnadze in Wyoming in September, Secretary Baker suggested that the “era of containment” had perhaps come to an end.
Then followed the Malta summit in December 1989, where President Bush and Gorbachev recognized common interests in maintaining stability in the midst of revolutionary political changes and were even explicit about accepting each others legitimate security interests and role in preserving European security.
The end of the Cold War solved one great problem for the US - the nuclear threat from the Soviet side was eliminated. But it caused a series of other problems. “The Cold War ended wih the US and Britain in recession, the Japanese stock market tumbling by 40 per cent, with the wealth of Germany devoted to the rescue of its reunited compatriots, and the world poised for war in the Persian Gulf.
The Post-Cold War Era, 1991 onwards.
With the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) and the dissolution of the SU after the failed coup, August 1991, the US faced the another problem - the lack of a coherent American foreign policy. There is no clear consensus in the US over the threats to the security and economic well-being of the US.
Bush administration’s emphasis was on prudence and pragmatism. The Bush record of six military interventions in four years is remarkable. In the invasion of Panama (Operation Just Came) in December 1989, the Persian Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) in January and February 1991, and the intervention in Somalia in 1992 (Operation Restore Hope), the US was motivated by the desire to impose order in the international system.
But neither the foreign nor the defense policy of the Clinton administration is yet well defined. Through the 1992 presidential campaign, Clinton emphasized the following new priorities for the post-Cold War American foreign policy: (1) to relink foreign and domestic policies; (2) the reassertion of “the moral principles most Americans share”; (3) to understand that American security is largely economic. He also campaigned for the restructuring US military forces. The new military force must be capable